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Introduction
A problem for logic and logicians is to find the suitable logi-
cal forms corresponding to the sentences in natural language. 
Solving this problem is really difficult1, and this circumstance 
is, probably, one of  the reasons that have led certain theories to 
claim that human reasoning and language have nothing to do 
with logic. One of  these theories is that of  the mental models2. 
1 Cf., e.g., P. N. Johnson-Laird, Against logical form, in Psychologica Belgica, 
5 (2010) 3/4, 193-221; M. López-astorga, Mental models, logical forms, and the 
horns sophism, in Cogency, 8 (2016) 1, 7-19. 
2 Cf., e.g., Johnson-Laird, Against logical form; P. N. Johnson-Laird, Inference 
with mental models, in K. J. hoLyoak - r. g. Morrison, The Oxford Handbook 
of  Thinking and Reasoning, Oxford University Press, New York 2012, 134-145; 
P. n. Johnson-Laird, How to improve thinking, in R. Wegerif - L. Li - J. C. 
kaufMan, The Routledge International Handbook of  Research on Teaching Thinking, 
Routledge, Abingdon & New York 2015, 80-91; P. n. Johnson-Laird – r. M. 
J. Byrne, Conditionals: A theory of  meaning, pragmatics, and inference, in Psychological 
Review 109 (2002) 4, 646-678; S. kheMLani – M. Lotstein – J. g. trafton – p. 
n. Johnson-Laird, Immediate inferences from quantified assertions, in The Quarterly 
Journal of  Experimental Psychology 68 (2015) 10, 2073-2096; I. orenes – p. n. 
Johnson-Laird, Logic, models, and paradoxical inferences, in Mind & Language 27 
(2012) 4, 357-377; M. ragni – t. sonntag – p. n. Johnson-Laird, Spatial condi-
tionals and illusory inferences, in Journal of  Cognitive Psychology 28 (2016) 3, 348-365.
Quest’opera è distribuita con Licenza Creative Commons Attribuzione - Non commerciale - Non opere 
derivate 4.0 Internazionale.
A
is
th
em
a,
 In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 J
ou
rn
al
  V
ol
. I
V
 (
20
17
),
 fa
sc
ic
ol
o 
1
W
W
W
.A
IS
T
H
E
M
A
.E
U
According to it, the sentences do not refer to logical forms, 
but to semantic possibilities called ‘models’, and this can be not-
ed not only in sentences of  everyday language, but also in sen-
tences included in scientific or philosophical arguments.
The main goal of  this paper is to show that, indeed, this is 
so at least in the case of  an important thesis about the soul pro-
vided by the first of  the known Greek philosophers, Thales of  
Miletus. True, he proposes a thesis hard to express by means of  
the logical forms of  standard logic and whose meaning, howev-
er, can be captured by means of  semantic models such as those 
of  the mental models theory (from now on, MMT) without dif-
ficulties. To prove this, firstly, I will describe and comment on 
the passage authored by Diogenes Laërtius in which it is said 
that, according to Aristotle and Hippias, that thesis was actually 
raised by Thales, and what the thesis exactly provides. Then, I 
will explain why the aforementioned thesis has a sense that it is 
not easy to relate to a well-formed formula of  standard logic. 
Thirdly, I will argue in favor of  the idea that the framework of  
MMT does have the means to represent the real meaning of  
the thesis in a simple way. And finally, I will address a possible 
objection against my arguments. So, I begin by the passage.
1. The beings without soul have soul
The passage is to be found exactly in, as mentioned, a work 
written by Diogenes Laërtius. In particular, it is in Vitae Philoso-
phorum, I 243. The original text in ancient Greek is as follows:
3 See also, e.g., G. S. kirk – J. e. raven – M. sChofieLd, The Presocratic Philos-
ophers: A Critical History with a Selection of  the Texts, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1983, Fragment 90.
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Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ καὶ Ἱππίας φασὶν αὐτὸν καὶ τοῖς ἀψύχοις 
μεταδιδόναι ψυχῆς, τεκμαιρόμενον ἐκ τῆς λίθου τῆς μαγνήτιδος 
καὶ τοῦ ἠλέκτρου.
[Aristotle and Hippias claim that he (Thales) assigns a soul to 
the beings without a soul, coming to this conclusion from the 
magnetic stone and the amber]
What, in principle, is controversial or problematic about this 
passage is that it seems to include a clear logical contradiction, 
which can be noted if  the words ἀψύχοις and ψυχῆς are consid-
ered. As it is known, ψυχῆς is the singular genitive case of  ψυχή-
ῆς, which means ‘soul’, and ἀψύχοις is the plural dative case of  
ἄψυχος-ον, which means ‘without a soul’. So, what the thesis 
appears to provide is that the things that do not have a soul do 
have it. This, undoubtedly, it is a problem from the standard log-
ic point of  view, as it is hard to capture such an idea in a logical 
form of  that logic. In Greek, the letter ‘α’ as a prefix indicates 
denial, which implies that, if, for example, the letter ‘p’ is used to 
refer to ψυχή-ῆς, the expression ‘¬p’ (where ‘¬’ is negation) must 
be used to denote ἄψυχος-ον. I explain to what extent this fact 
can be a difficulty in first-order predicate logic in more detail in 
the next section.
2. First order-predicate logic and the Thales’ thesis 
about the soul
Indeed, to formally express the thesis in first-order predicate 
logic, it is necessary to assume equivalences such as these ones:
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∀: universal quantifier
x: independent variable
P: to have a soul
→: conditional relationship
Thus, a well formed formula that could capture the idea could 
be this one:
∀x (¬Px → Px)
That is, ‘for any x, if  x does not have a soul, x has a soul’.
The problems of  this formula are obvious, but they can be even 
clearer if  we note that the formula can be transformed, by vir-
tue of  the universal quantifier elimination rule, i.e., the rule that 
allows deriving [Pa] (where ‘a’ is a constant) from [∀x Px], into 
the following:
¬Pa → Pa
Evidently, a formula such as this one is hard to accept. If, for 
example, ‘a’ denotes a chair, i.e., an object without a soul, the 
formula enables derive, by virtue of  Modus Ponendo Ponens, that is, 
the rule that allows deducing a formula such as [q] from formu-
lae such as [p → q] and [p], that it has a soul. In this way, [¬Pa] 
and [Pa] would be true at the same time, and a contradiction 
would be found: [Pa ⋀ ¬Pa] (where ‘⋀’ stands for conjunction). 
However, as it is well known, contradictions lead to complex sit-
uations in standard logic, since they enable to conclude any well 
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formed formula that can be supposed, which means that any 
conclusion can be inferred from them. It is evident that neither 
Aristotle nor Hippias meant that, according to Thales, any idea 
is valid. It is also obvious that Thales did not think that either. 
Therefore, it can be said that standard logic is not a suitable 
framework to address the Thales’ thesis about the soul. Nev-
ertheless, the same observation does not apply to MMT. This 
theory has the necessary machinery to express the real meaning 
of  that thesis. The next section shows this.
3. MMT and the problem of  the soul in Thales
MMT does not resort to formulae. It only uses models or rep-
resentations of  reality that correspond to the different possible 
states of  affairs. Such representations are iconic4 and reveal pos-
sible situations or scenarios in which some element changes5.
In this way, it is absolutely clear that MMT is not a formal 
theory, and that semantics and pragmatics are very important to 
it. Thus, beyond its logical form, it is evident that what the frag-
ment authored by Diogenes Laërtius described above actually 
means is that Aristotle and Hippias state that Thales of  Miletus 
attributed a soul not to the beings without a soul, but even to 
the beings that are usually thought not to be a soul. According-
ly, it can be assumed that the thesis implicitly distinguishes two 
totally different ideas: (A) being thought not to be a soul and (B) 
really having a soul.
Given these ideas, in principle, it could be thought that 
the possible combinations of  possibilities including (A) and (B) 
would be the following:
4 E.g., Johnson-Laird, Inference with mental models, 136-137.
5 E.g., Johnson-Laird, Inference with mental models, 137.
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[I] A    B
[II] A    ¬B
[III] ¬A    B
[IV] ¬A    ¬B
[I], [II], [III], and [IV] represents possible scenarios of  the 
world in which almost everything is the same, but the reality of  
(A) and (B). For example, the worlds described in [I] and [II] are 
practically identical. The only difference between them is that 
in [I] (B) is true and in [II] (B) is false. In [III] (B) is true again 
but (A) is false. Obviously, in [IV] the two elements of  the model 
are false.
Nevertheless, taking into account the literature on MMT6, 
it can be said that, following the theory, although, if  all the mod-
els are identified, [I], [III], and [IV] are a priori those corre-
sponding to conditional sentences, in practice, semantics and 
pragmatics can modify the possible scenarios. Thus, in the case 
of  the Thales’ thesis, the models that must be rejected are actu-
ally two: [II] and [IV]. [II] is not admissible because it describes 
a situation in which something is considered to have a soul and 
it does not really have it, which is inconsistent with the idea that 
Thales seems to support. On the other hand, [IV] is not accept-
able either because it refers to a possibility in which something 
that is thought not to be a soul does not truly have it, which is 
also incompatible with what Thales appears to mean. 
So, the only possibilities that can be taken into account are 
[I] and [III]. Indeed, both of  them together seem to appropri-
ately describe the world such as understood by Thales of  Mile-
tus. Everything in that world has a soul –(B) is true both in [I] 
6 And, especially, works such as Johnson-Laird, Against logical form; John-
son-Laird, Inference with mental models; kheMLani et al., Immediate inferences.
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and in [III]- whether it is thought to have a soul –in [I] (A) is 
true – or not –in [III] (A) is false.
Furthermore, the sentences that only refers to models such 
as [I] and [III] are not uncommon in MMT. The theory holds 
that, for example, there are many sentences that are expressed 
by means of  a conditional in natural language and that only 
can be related to these two last models. Such sentences are con-
sidered to be of  the kind ‘Relevance’ in the paper authored by 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne7 and an example of  them is as follows:
“If  you are interested in seeing Vertigo then it is on TV to-
night”8.
If  we assume that now (A) indicates that ‘you are interested in 
seeing Vertigo’ and that (B) denotes that ‘Vertigo is on TV to-
night’, the reasons why [I] and [III] are the suitable models in 
this case too are not difficult to understand. It is known for sure 
that Vertigo will be on TV tonight. [II] and [IV] hence cannot 
be admitted, since in them (B) is false. On the other hand, al-
though this is so, you might be interested in seeing it or not, and 
in [I] you are interested and in [III] you are not.
Thus, based on all of  this, it seems that the thesis about 
the soul held by Thales confirms that human language is more 
linked to the mental models of  MMT than to the formulae of  
standard logic. Logical forms appear to be unable to capture 
what the sentences in natural language really mean, and this 
is a problem that, in principle, MMT does not have. However, 
an objection against this argument can be given. A sentence in 
natural language can be formalized in different ways in first-or-
7 Cf. Johnson-Laird – Byrne, Conditionals.
8 Johnson-Laird – Byrne, Conditionals, 663.
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der predicate logic. So, the logical form assigned to the Thales’ 
thesis in the previous section is not the only one that is possible. 
In my view, this does not solve the problem of  standard logic 
with logical form in this case, and I explain why below.
4. Other possible formalizations are also problematic
True, it could be argued that the two clauses of  the thesis do not 
have to be considered as contradictory elements (p and ¬p), that 
it can be assumed that ‘P’ refers to ‘being considered to have a 
soul’ and that ‘Q’ represents ‘having really a soul’, and that an-
other possible formula valid for the Thales’ idea can be this one:
∀x (Px → Qx)
Undoubtedly, this new formula removes the difficulties of  con-
tradiction but not all the difficulties. Firstly, transforming the 
text written by Diogenes Laërtius into this last formula requires 
taking semantic and pragmatic factors into account, and not 
just logical form. Therefore, accepting this formula is really ac-
cepting basic and important theses of  MMT, such as, for exam-
ple, that logical form do not determine the sense of  a sentence 
and that that sense can be identified only considering aspects 
such as the meaning, the context or the role of  pragmatics. On 
the other hand, the formula is not very useful, since, given, for 
example, [¬Pa], that is, something that is considered not to be 
a soul (i.e., the type of  beings to which Thales seem to refer), 
nothing can be inferred. As indicated, a formula such as [∀x (Px 
→ Qx)] can be transformed into [Pa → Qa], but no formula can 
be deduced from this last formula along with [¬Pa]. And this is 
so because there is no a valid rule in standard logic that allows 
deriving something from formulae such as [p → q] and [¬p].
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Of  course, this difficulty could be overcome proposing 
a new formalization and assuming that a better formula for 
Thales’ thesis can be, for example, the following:
∀x (¬Px → Qx)
Indeed, this formula appears to better capture Thales’ thought, 
since it provides that, if  something is considered not to have 
a soul, it has a soul. Nonetheless, the problem remains. It can 
be transformed into [¬Pa → Qa], and this last expression into 
[¬Qa → Pa] by contraposition (as it is well known, in standard 
logic, [p → q] is equivalent to [¬q → ¬p]). But, what this last for-
mula means is that, if  ‘a’ does not have a soul, then ‘a’ is consid-
ered to have a soul, which makes no sense and does not seem to 
correspond to the idea of  universe that Thales raised. It is clear 
that in that universe [¬Qa] is always false, since everything has 
a soul. However, [¬Qa → Pa] implies that, if  something truly 
without a soul is ever found, in spite of  that, we must contin-
ue to think that it has a soul, and this, evidently, is not Thales’ 
view. And this drawback in addition to the fact that semantics 
and pragmatics are also necessary to come, from words such as 
ψυχή-ῆς and ἄψυχος-ον, to [∀sx (¬Px → Qx)], a very complex 
formula9.
There is no doubt that other alternative formulae with dif-
ferent sophistication levels are possible. Nevertheless, it is very 
probable that they have difficulties akin to the previous ones, 
or even worse inconveniences. Therefore, as stated, the Thales’ 
thesis about the soul can be considered to be one more proof  
9 As indicated, papers to be reviewed on the difficulties of  translating expres-
sions in natural language into formulae of  standard logic can be, e.g., John-
son-Laird, Against logical form; or López-astorga, Mental models.
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that language is more related to semantic mental models than to 
purely syntactic logical forms.
Conclusions
The literature of  cognitive science shows that MMT is a power-
ful theory that is able to account for many aspects of  the human 
intellectual behavior. One of  them is obviously the way human 
beings build mental representations from expressions in natural 
language. This can be checked in many works supporting the 
theory, but it is confirmed by the arguments provided in this 
paper as well.
On the other hand, the same literature also reveals that it 
is sometimes hard to standard logic to explain even the results 
in certain deductive reasoning experimental tasks10. Clearly, this 
is related to the fact that, as said above, there are not exact and 
clear correspondences between the expressions in natural lan-
guage and the formal machinery of  standard logic, and that 
logical forms cannot usually capture the exact meaning of  the 
sentences11.
Therefore, maybe, from fields such as that of  Philosophy of  
Language, it is necessary to pay more attention to the review of  
the semantic possibilities. In fact, as in this paper for Thales of  
Miletus, in many other works it has been shown that this last ac-
tivity can also be methodologically useful to better understand 
logical, philosophical, linguistic, or psychological theories, prob-
lems, and issues12. So, although MMT is not the only cognitive 
10 Cf., e.g., orenes – Johnson-Laird, Logic, models, and paradoxical inferences.
11 As pointed out, Johnson-Laird, Against logical form; or LÓpez-AstorgA, 
Mental models, can be very illustrative in this sense.
12 Just two examples of  the several papers in this direction authored by 
López-Astorga can be M. López-astorga, The first rule of  Stoic logic and its rela-
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theory nowadays and there are other cognitive approaches that 
are based on other assumptions, it seems that it should be ac-
knowledged that it can give at least interesting tools to be used 
in very different research projects with diverse aims and goals.
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